## AT: EU CP

### 2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In

#### EU strategic autonomy is impossible – practical obstacles and inevitable reliance on NATO

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Nevertheless, at the strategic level, the EU–NATO relationship remains absolutely fundamental to the future of the European security and defence project for two interconnected and seemingly incompatible reasons. The first is the very existence of NATO, its history, its mythology and its political reality: an alliance that, unlike any other in history, has outlived the demise of the threat against which it was initially created. This has been in very large part due to US leadership and to the perceived usefulness of NATO to American global strategy. US leadership has had, as an inevitable corollary, European followership. Whatever the specifics of the constant tensions over burden-sharing, American leadership has generated a degree of demotivation on the part of Europeans, which US commentators have castigated as “free-riding”. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, there have been growing demands, in Washington, for the EU to take over greater direct responsibility for the stabilisation of its volatile neighbourhood (the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Eastern borderlands). Europe, since 1989, has ceased to be central to the US strategic radar screen. This has given rise to the various projects for a European defence capacity, both from within NATO (the short-lived attempt, in the 1990s, to form a European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI) (Howorth and Keeler 2003), and outside of NATO (the 20-year quest for a Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) (Howorth 2014). However, so long as US policy suggests that Uncle Sam will always be on hand to ensure European security if a serious crisis develops, there will inevitably be clear limits to the ambition of the purely European project.

From this perspective, the “micro-cooperation” that forms the focus of some articles in this special issue (in particular, Smith et al. 2017, Graeger 2017), is only one part of the challenge. Arguably, as Duke and Gebhard (2017) suggest in this volume, and as the case studies of Fiott (2017), Lavallée (2017), Mayer (2017) conclude, of even greater long-term concern is the overall nature of the relationship between these two security actors. What is each of them for? Why does Europe need two such entities? Should ever greater cooperation lead to a formal division of labour or to a radically new balance of responsibilities and commitment as between the US and the Europeans?

When the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) was first launched in December 1998, the key concept was “autonomous action”. The EU, it was asserted, would develop its own strategic vision. The European framework would allow the member states to generate serious military capacity, whereas in NATO they would simply free-ride. And CSDP would allow European forces to tackle regional security challenges the US did not wish to engage with. Alas, CSDP did none of those things. Almost two decades later, the EU Global Strategy asserted that the EU’s foreign and security policy goal remains “strategic autonomy”. If words have meaning, this suggests an ambition for Europe to become self-reliant in defence. The reality, as we have seen in Libya and Ukraine, and as it is lived by member states with a Russian border, is that Europe appears to be more dependent on NATO and the US than at any point since the 1980s. Yet Donald Trump has called NATO obsolete, thereby significantly intensifying the European drive for a new defence capacity (Trump 2016). And his view is by no means marginal in the US. Major International Relations scholars such as Barry Posen (2014), Andrew Bacevich (2016), John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2016) have recently called for the US progressively to withdraw from NATO and to hand it over, lock stock and barrel, to the Europeans. How likely is such a scenario and what are the alternatives?

In May 2017, Angela Merkel, deploring Trump’s berating of the European allies at the previous week’s NATO summit, famously declared that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent” (Merkel 2017). The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, even suggested that European integration itself could be re-kick-started via the drive for defence integration (Juncker 2017). And yet, all these voices continue to insist that cooperation between the EU and NATO is vital to this process. How can the aspiration for autonomy coexist with intensified cooperation? If the EU actually achieves strategic autonomy, what is NATO for? Conversely, if the EU does not achieve strategic autonomy, what is CSDP for? Europeans need to be totally realistic. There are huge obstacles standing in the way of “strategic autonomy”: persistent nationalist reflexes from member states; significant divergences in European strategic cultures; lack of consensus about the level of ambition in this policy area; challenges to defence budgets in a time of austerity; the sheer scale of the challenges facing Europe in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; the absence of public awareness of and/or support for a more muscular or assertive Europe; and above all the parallel existence of NATO. I see three scenarios for the future of EU–NATO relations.

#### European crises have empirically inspired an increase in EU-NATO collaboration – proven by cybersecurity threats

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Studying the EU–NATO relationship as practice enables the researcher to transcend the extraordinary-everyday dichotomy but also to overcome the arguably “hyped-up” focus on the extraordinary in security and strategic studies. While designed to provide a (rapid) response to an extraordinary situation or event, security production involves practices that are ordinary, day-to-day experiences and where social artefacts constitute an essential part. In the EU–NATO relationship, such artefacts include everything from meeting agendas, reports, and informal memos exchanged between EU and NATO staff and diplomats, informal briefings by EU commanders in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or by NATO commanders in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as mutual visits to EU and NATO vessels at sea in the anti-piracy or refugee operations (Græger 2016).7.

However, crises may also strengthen and expand the repertoire of everyday security practice. The Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 put the relevance of EU–NATO cooperation, also for territorial security, back on the political agenda.8 Both the EU High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General have emphasised that a more uncertain and hostile European security environment is a challenge that their respective organisations should handle together (Mogherini 2014, NATO 2016a, 2016b). Since 2014, EU and NATO representatives have met informally on several occasions to exchange views, discuss common or coordinated responses, and convey joint messages to the external world.9

This is not an entirely new phenomenon, however. Crises, especially when Europe is expected to take a stand or a specific role, have facilitated EU–NATO communication and opened up meeting arenas that the “Cyprus issue” has otherwise rendered inaccessible. For instance, reciprocal informal cross-briefings and meetings between the ambassadors in the NAC and the PSC happened during “the Arab Spring” and the Libya operations during 2011, as well as when violence broke out on the ground in Kosovo in 2007 and in 2012 (Græger 2016). Although the frameworks for the coordination of defence, capability development, training of personnel etc. established as part of the Berlin Plus Agreement and Agreed Framework have been blocked since 2005, the member states of both organisations generally have turned a blind eye to practical cooperation as long as it generates results and is conducted discretely, sensitively, and without serious incidents (Smith 2011, p. 255).10 At the operational level, EU and NATO staff have found ways of working alongside each other or together both in crisis management operations, support missions (e.g. handling refugees), and anti-piracy operations.

Practice approaches are able to capture the essence of these informal encounters, which constitute the intersubjective understandings of security and how to handle them, whether as part of the everyday production of security or a response to major crises.

The perceived strategic uncertainty in Europe the past years surely has securitised EU–NATO cooperation, rendering an expansion of cooperation outside of Berlin Plus politically desirable and possible. New threats, such as “hybrid warfare” and cyberattacks, but also energy-security, capacity building in third countries, and illegal migration and refugee flows opened up new areas of practical cooperation. In responding to the refugee crisis from 2015, NATO and the EU signed an agreement in March 2016, emphasising that they had reached a “common understanding” on the modalities of the cooperation. In practical terms, it implied ensuring consistency and complementarity of the Frontex operation and NATO’s support activities (European Commission 2016). New initiatives regarding information sharing and incident response coordination between NATO and the EU have also been made within the cyber security domain (EEAS 2016). These agreements and coordination of activity are examples of everyday practice that originates in the extraordinary.

#### NATO and the EU are intertwined when it comes to security and defense – overlap, liaison offices, and formal agreements make cooperation frequent

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Increasing interactions and functional overlap depend, however, also on the distribution of power among the two organisations, which can either be symmetric or asymmetric. Traditionally, power is in the hands of states with autonomy over decision-making and it has been distinguished between “power over”, power exerted by one actor over another in a relationship, and “power to”, the ability to trigger change and shape certain outcomes (Ojanen 2018). In this context, power of an organisation denotes “its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap”. Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called “sectoral specialisation” of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisation needs to withdraw its governance activities from the respective policy area (Gehring and Faude 2014, p. 479). In the case of a symmetric power distribution, both organisations need to coordinate their governance activities in the overlapping policy area. Herein, multiple members – those states that are members of more than one international organisation within the same interorganisational network – play a crucial role as they can negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Under symmetrical power distribution, co-governance and a division of labour are more likely to occur than role specification (Gehring and Faude 2014). Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose “that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex” (2014, p. 482). Division of labour then results in enhanced cooperation and fostered exchanges. In the case of the EU and NATO, their functional overlaps have increased over time as both have actively collaborated, for example, in crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and off the Somali coast. As a result, they have become so-called interlocking institutions due to their increasing coordination and cooperation (Biermann 2009, Schleich 2014).

Interorganisational interactions are not a one-way street and can take different forms including exchanges of information and material resources, coordination of activities, joint activities and decision-making and the establishment of formal structures (cf. Biermann 2008, 2015). Interorganisational relations may also go a step further in which one organisation can influence and shape the other’s policies, procedures and institutions, leading to a process of socialisation and learning from the other organisation (Johnston 2001). While learning can be accelerated through the rotation and exchange of staff members, the so-called alumni effect (Koops 2017a, 2017b), it can also be prevented by communication problems, lack of implementation and shortage of resources.

Since interorganisational relations are a dynamic process of exchanges and coordination, they take place on different levels within the organisations. Building on Waltz (1959) distinction of three levels of analysis – international system, state and individual – interorganisational interactions occur within the network of IOs in the same policy area (international system level), are shaped by their member states as well as by individual key players within the organisations and their member states. Koops (2017a, 2017b) introduces two additional levels: the bureaucratic level and the inter-secretariat (also called inter-institutional) level. While the bureaucratic level refers to administrative structures within IOs, where decisions are taken and the day-to-day management occurs, the inter-secretariat level includes jointly created cooperation channels, such as working groups and steering committees that oversee the formal cooperation in an interorganisational relationship. Liaison committees and working groups in the case of EU-NATO cooperation have played particularly relevant roles. For example, the EU and NATO introduced and actively engaged via their liaison facilities since 2000 with a focus on capabilities which later resulted in the creation of the EU-NATO Capability Group in 2003 (Messervy-Whiting 2005). Besides these formal channels of cooperation, informal exchanges play a crucial role, especially in cases of organisational incompatibility or other institutional and legal barriers. This is particularly relevant for EU-NATO relations because of the so-called participation problem and the issue of limited sharing of classified information and intelligence despite the signing of the 2003 Security of Information Agreement (Lachmann 2010, Smith 2011, Græger 2017).

An interorganisational relationship emerges only under certain circumstances. In the regime complexity and organisation theory literatures, scholars have developed and compiled key components. These allow to identify and study EU-NATO cooperation as an interorganisational relationship and highlight the specifics of their relationship. For example, both Merrett and Aldrich (cited in Dijkstra 2017) identify four key dimensions of interorganisational interactions – formalisation, intensity, symmetry and standardisation – which have also been picked up by Gehring and Oberthür (2004, 2009). In addition to the levels of institutionalisation, the frequency and intensity of interactions, and the power relations (symmetry) among organisations, Gehring and Oberthür, emphasise the relevance of functional overlap and membership overlap. In this context, Young (1999) distinguishes between functional interplay and political interplay. Functional interplay occurs when at least two organisations deal with the same issue or problem and when these organisations are geophysically or socioeconomically linked. Political interplay implies an intentional interplay, i.e. created on purpose by the concerned organisations to set up links in pursuit of specific goals, which can either be collective or individual.

Regime complexity, network analysis and interorganisational relations, interestingly, cannot grasp the full scope of member states in the interactions between two organisations. Although they possess the explanatory power to depict the relevance of secretariats, member states still play a minor role. Due to their focus on the bureaucracies and secretariats, these approaches express little about how states can impact the evolution of interorganisational relations. As reality has shown, several member states have essentially affected EU-NATO relations, particularly France, Cyprus and Turkey, which needs to be accounted for in theorising interorganisational cooperation. After all, states are the key building blocks of organisations, possess the main decision-making power in security issues and make essential contributions of financial resources and capabilities (Abbott and Snidal 1998, Koch 2008). Member states have thus a decisive impact also on interorganisational cooperation because they can steer the direction of the organisation’s external relations, its partnerships and general orientation. Against this backdrop, member states shape interorganisational relations under certain conditions: They need to be the main decision-makers, particularly in cases of unanimity rule, and provide key resources for maintaining cooperation.

While the interactions between the EU and NATO are rooted in the security and defence realm and are based on several formal agreements and declarations such as the 2003 and 2016 Joint Declarations and the Security of Information Agreement, they also maintain liaison offices and frequently exchange information. Yet, what has become most prominent in their relationship are the overlaps in their functions and membership. Functional overlap indicates the overlap of policy areas and mandates that are covered by the IOs (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Hofmann 2019). It is expected that more links and opportunities for dialogue and exchanges exist with more functional overlaps. This dimension also includes geographical scope, i.e. the geographical area covered by an international organisation regarding both membership and activity. Membership overlap is another defining component, which refers to the number of states that are members in more than one international security organisations. Here it is assumed that a higher level of membership overlap facilitates interactions and generally affects cooperation, either positively or negatively. Membership overlap is particularly defining for EU-NATO cooperation since twenty-one NATO states are also member of the EU, which means that issues discussed at NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) are transferable to the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and vice versa. Although the high degree of membership overlap makes EU-NATO cooperation a specific case of interorganisational relations, the issue of membership has also provided much room for tensions and obstacles (cf. Koops 2017b).

#### EU separation from NATO is impossible – interest in close cooperation and lack of independent capabilities

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NATO has strong and deterrent military capabilities, and no one is in doubt that when there is political will and solidarity among its members, the Alliance is able to respond any threat coming from an external source.

On the other hand, the EU is still in a soul-searching process in terms of its military role in the current European security architecture; still seeking to achieve strategic autonomy from NATO, it has been caught unprepared for the US President Trump’s approach to NATO and European security.

Despite the progress achieved in the past decades, the EU integration process in the field of security and defence has not moved ahead as fast as progress in other areas. The reasons behind this are diverse, and include the UK’s reluctance to invest in the EU efforts as it considered the NATO the primary organization in charge of European security, the USA’s unclear position towards European integration in the area of security and defence, and differences of opinion among the major EU countries on how to deal with the RF.137

In transatlantic relations, ensuring close co-operation and synergy between NATO and the EU in areas of common concern is important. These two key institutions have a common objective, namely ensuring peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Through regular meetings and contacts, they work together and co-ordinate closely to ensure that their activities are complementary and mutually reinforcing. NATO appreciates the EU’s increased efforts to enhance its defence capabilities through new initiatives like EDF and PESCO, which will also contribute to the strength of NATO; the EU, on the other hand, values NATO’s ongoing efforts, undertaken in a spirit of alliance and collective security, to ensure the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, including through its fight against terrorism. In this sense, the two organizations are aware of each other’s important roles and contributions to the maintenance of security and stability in their respective areas of responsibility.138

In the opinion of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the cooperation between NATO and the EU on military issues has never been closer. At the NATO Defence Ministers meeting held in Brussels at the end of July 2018, Secretary General Stoltenberg mentioned that in 74 areas, which range from cybersecurity to joint naval operations and the fight against terrorism, the EU and NATO have been working together and making significant progress.139

In the context of the EU’s military projects, which are aimed at enhancing the EU’s defence capabilities and supplementing NATO assets, the EU Commission proposed to invest 6.5 billion Euro over the next decade in Europe’s highways so that armed vehicles could be transported easily around the continent. The priority given to military infrastructure results from lessons drawn from deployment of military vehicles from across Europe to the Baltics in 2018.140

As they face common threats and challenges, pursue similar strategic objectives through close co-ordination and co-operation, NATO and the EU have achieved a significant level of complementarity in planning and developing their defence capabilities. It is thus fair to conclude that the relationship between the two organizations is characterized more by synergy than by rivalry

#### Any future EU-led military operations will inevitably involve NATO jurisdiction

Dr. Peter van Ham 2k, professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies at Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany, “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the U.S., and Russia”, April 2000, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-papers/europes-new-defense-ambitions-implications-nato-us-and-russia/europes-new-defense-ambitions-implications-nato-us#toc-finding-a-new-transatlantic-military-balance> /lg

Although the EU’s Helsinki communiqué stresses the need to avoid “unnecessary duplication” of the EU’s defense organization with that of NATO, it is clear that some duplication of capabilities and infrastructure is inevitable and, probably, even beneficial. It should not be overlooked that most of WEU already duplicates, in one way or another, NATO structures. The EU has, therefore, accepted that some duplication of effort and organization is foreseeable. If Europe’s new defense ambitions were to provide Europeans with more military capabilities (i.e., more strategic transport and intelligence capabilities), thereby duplicating what the United States already has available, this would be the type of replication all NATO allies could happily live with.

NATO’s Fading Centrality. Another issue which will have to be thrashed out is the future relationship between the “New EU” and NATO. Non-EU NATO members have made it clear that they want to be involved in the decision shaping process on European defense. The United States has tried to formalize the EU-NATO relationship on these issues, but France has blocked these efforts and claims that the Europeans first have to clarify their military ambitions among themselves. Paris also argues that, for the time being, WEU should be the institution of choice for debating defense issues with other European countries, as well as with Turkey and the United States. The EU has, however, decided to embark upon strengthening ties between the European Parliament (to include its working groups and committees) and NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly.

Another part of this debate is the vital question of whether NATO has to be consulted first, before any independent European military action will be undertaken. In the lead up to the Helsinki summit, Washington made it clear that before the EU decides to act on its own in a crisis situation - with or without the use of NATO assets - NATO should be given a first option, or a right of first refusal, to intervene. This problem of the order in which decisions are to be made, in short “sequencing,” is important, because at NATO’s Washington summit in April 1999 it was agreed that the EU would have a “presumed access” to Alliance assets should U.S. troops not become involved in a specific military operation. American officials also made it clear that “[e]ven if Washington decides not to send troops, we still want to be involved in the decision-making process from the beginning."15

Two goals are at odds - EU autonomy vs. letting non - EU states influence decisions.

In this respect, the Helsinki declaration is a cause for some concern for the United States, as it continues to stress the need for EU autonomy over the involvement of non-EU states in decision making. Although it argues that “NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members and will continue to have an important role in crisis management,” this does not imply that NATO will endure as Europe’s pivotal security organization. In the future, Europe may well be capable of taking autonomous military action without recourse to NATO and even without first asking the United States to become involved. This is the scenario which Washington fears may provoke a transatlantic decoupling and, thus, spell the end of NATO as we know it - i.e., a NATO based on American supremacy. Although this would not necessarily be a serious disadvantage to Washington, in that a self-reliant EU would take some of the military weight off America’s shoulders, the long-term implications could be huge. The EU’s combined economic, political, and military influence would transform Europe into a serious rival to the United States on the world stage. EU foreign policy objectives would overlap, but would certainly not be identical to those of the United States. Europeans, for example, remain less fixated on China and on issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They are more concerned with legitimizing their policies by international law and a UN Security Council mandate and less hostile to “rogue states” like Iran and Cuba. This implies that a stronger EU would not always have to be in full agreement with the United States on many important global political issues.

Plans for a new Euro-force remain modest and accomplish little more than enabling the EU to take military action without the United States.

For the time being, however, the likelihood of autonomous, EU-led military operations is remote. Although path-breaking, the Helsinki summit plans for a new Euro-force remain modest and would accomplish little more than to enable the EU to take military action if the United States does not want to be involved. For many years to come any European-led military operation will remain highly dependent upon NATO command structures as well as on U.S. intelligence and logistics, if not more. It is, therefore, difficult to foresee how the EU would mount any serious operation without at least the consent of the United States. But, it is the continuing uncertainty and vagueness of the operational details of the EU’s military structure and its future missions that cause concern across the Atlantic. In an effort to assuage American concerns, the EU has proposed to offer key NATO military representatives permanent seats, or observer status, in the EU’s PSC and MC. Another EU proposal offers NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to participate, “as appropriate,” in the EU’s MC. In any case, of the 15 EU Member States, 11 plan to send the same representatives to the EU and NATO military committees, which should ensure both transparency and relatively smooth cooperation.

However, the higher mathematics of consultation mechanisms do not inform us what the “New EU” actually plans to do with its fresh military power. This remains unclear. For the time being, Europe’s CESDP is bound to have limited, regional ambitions. The EU debate focuses on Petersberg missions and not on territorial or collective defense and, therefore, does not touch upon Article V of WEU’s founding treaty (which offers a mutual assistance guarantee). Europe’s military strategic planning will, therefore, focus on regional concerns and will not, at least not yet, adopt a global scope. However, whereas London has coined the phrase that the EU will operate “in and around Europe,” Mr. Solana is already talking about an EU which might want to act in Africa as well as in East Timor,16 and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has argued that “[t]he Europe of the future must be able to defend its interests and values effectively worldwide.”17 The European Commission’s Strategic Objectives report of February 2000 also argues that the EU should aim at a “Europe which can show genuine leadership on the world stage.”18

However, although retaining a regional focus might acquiesce to American demands, it also complicates an already grim transatlantic debate on NATO’s role in preventing the proliferation of WMD. In addition to the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the Clinton administration also wants to tinker with the existing Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, proposing that the United States set up its own national missile shield. Many European states worry that this will not only set off another global arms race, but may also decouple the strategic interests within the Alliance, when the United States becomes less vulnerable to missile attacks. In any case, this global/regional dichotomy is bound to increase transatlantic tensions and to exacerbate U.S. concern over Europe’s defense ambitions.

### 2AC – Strategic Autonomy Fails

#### Strategic autonomy fails due to “strategic cacophony” and capacity shortfalls – best study

Hugo Meijer & Stephen G. Brooks 21, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies & professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back”, Spring 2021, International Security 45(4), p. 7-43 /lg

Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of deªned categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deªciency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Our analysis shows that European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by two major constraints: profound defense capacity shortfalls that will be hard to close, and “strategic cacophony,” that is, profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.12 These mutually reinforcing constraints impose a rigid limit on the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon. Consequently, if the United States were to fully withdraw, the continent would become signiªcantly more vulnerable to Russian meddling and aggression. Furthermore, if the U.S.-backed NATO were to disappear, this would undermine the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony. This, in turn, would make institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder.

Ultimately, we conclude that the notion that Europeans would be able to achieve defense autonomy following a U.S. pullback is illusory.13 And if even the major shock of a complete U.S. pullback would be very unlikely to move Europe away from its current strategic cacophony and capability shortfalls, a partial U.S. pullback—a much more likely counterfactual—would be more unlikely to do so. The policy implication is straightforward: if the United States wants European stability, it needs to stay in Europe.

#### Moving away from interoperability with NATO is impractical – too many European divisions on whether autonomy is desirable

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In addition, the level of logistical entanglement serves to illustrate why a separation of EU defence structures from NATO structures would be a near-impossibility: NATO Prague Capabilities Commitments resemble the Helsinki Headline Goal, NATO’s ‘smart defence’ resembles the aim of “pooling and sharing” (Ghent Framework). Autonomy from the US is thus being made all the more diffi cult by an institutional copying that duplicates capacities in function and purpose.55 Ronja Kempin and Barbara Kunz thus argue that “[i]t thus makes little sense for U.S.-skeptic Europeanists to pit themselves against Atlanticists as if we were back in de Gaulle’s 1960s or the post-Cold War 1990s”.56

The notifi cation of November 2017 to formally launch PESCO recognizes as much. The Council states: “Enhanced defence capabilities of EU Member States will also benefit NATO. They will strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance and respond to repeated demands for stronger transatlantic burden sharing” (p. 1), and writes of the need to ensure “interoperability with NATO” (p. 5). The mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty but never implemented, was launched on 23 June 2017. The ambition behind the realization of PESCO is to allow EU member states to work more closely together in the area of security and defence issues by providing “an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and its citizens”, as the notifi cation reads.57 On a broader conceptual level, the Commission has also launched its own White Paper on the future of Europe.58 Member states willing to cooperate more on defence matters would be able to do so under the third scenario put forward in the Commission White Paper (“those who want more do more”). As the Commission puts this vision of a multi-speed Europe in security affairs: “This includes a strong common research and industrial base, joint procurement, more integrated capabilities and enhanced military readiness for joint missions abroad”.59 Interestingly, scenario 4 (“doing less more effi ciently”) talks of a “European defence Union” that would be able to speak with one voice on all foreign policy issues.60

The EU Council’s decision to upgrade the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to 60 permanent staff in order to run Battlegroup-size executive military CSDP missions by the end of 2020 is an important step in this direction of ‘strategic autonomy’ (EEAS, 2018).61 The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) would also need to defi ne what capabilities are required of European contributors, if Europeans want to contribute to Article 5 operations, non-Article 5 operations without the US and other non-EU Allies (Norway, Turkey, Canada), and to be in a position to conduct autonomous expeditionary operations. But to do that, the EU will have to commence a genuine strategic debate that would serve as a framework to channel its resurfaced defence ambitions in order to credibly embed CSDP within a wider understanding of what ‘strategic autonomy’ should entail across multiple policy domains. The 2016 EU Global Strategy takes up the term of ‘strategic autonomy’ and develops European policy responses to the multiple challenges that the EU is confronted with (EU Council 2016).62 The EU “will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions”, as the EUGS states.

The “strategic partners” in far-away places like Brazil, China, or India, by contrast, no longer play a discernible role. After its publication, additional policy papers were released that were indicative of an accelerated move towards greater defence cooperation, such as the European Security Compact (a joint Franco-German paper, Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016), the Bratislava Road Map issued by the European Council on 16th September 2016, the EP’s vote on the European defence Union on 30th November 2016, the Commission’s European defence Action Plan, and its 2017 Refl ection paper on the future of European defence. Even the Commission, “traditionally reluctant to name the ‘D’ word”,63 was supportive, and has put forward the idea of a European Defence Fund (EDF) in June 2017. With this fund, €5.5 billion could be spent per year ‘to boost Europe’s defence capabilities’ in support of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, as the Commission announcement reads.64 The momentum for new defence policies, however, is complicated by corporate and political factors. Defence companies follow their own industrial logic, no matter how hard political leadership tries to push things in a certain direction.65 Mutual reservations within the Eurofighter consortium illustrate the diffi culty of creating truly European (i.e. transnational) defence contractors.66

Moreover, while the rhetoric of the US president has generated a renewed drive towards advancing “strategic autonomy”, the latter is unlikely to move beyond its buzzword use for as long as the EU remains an institutional vessel for its member states to agree to disagree on what to use it for in security and defence matters. For example, it irritated the Baltic states and frustrated the French that a truly operational PESCO – beyond the PR merits of its declaration – was of secondary importance to the Germans,67 and Eastern European member states tend to place greater confi dence in bilateral US security guarantees than others. A realistic reformulation of a European security identity is therefore likely to be based on enhanced cooperation between groups of countries that want to do more (as the 2017 Commission White Paper puts it), not on an EU-wide consolidated effort. The introduction of Qualifi ed Majority Voting (QMV) in the Foreign Affairs Council would be a further step in that direction, but is unlikely to materialise in a Union of 27, as attempts to circumvent consensus requirements in foreign policy questions continue to be perceived as sovereignty losses. This makes swift changes to transatlantic defence arrangements less likely.

Conclusions

Tracing the evolution of EU security and defence policies, this article has illustrated how European defence developments have often been reactive to American positions and perceptions. European security was conditional on the transatlantic element, but also complicated by the nature of intergovernmentalism in security affairs, national divergences in security cultures, and an absence of an EU-wide consensus as to what level of ambition in this domain is desirable. The two key issues of West German rearmament and the role of the US in nascent European defence ambitions dominated the discussion in the late 1940s and early 1950s and have served to forge a transatlantic community as an “Empire by Invitation”: as Europe invited the US in, it stymied security divergences between European member states. The failure of the Pleven plan and the EDC were indicative of the diffi culty of bridging the divide between Atlanticists and those member states in favour of more European security and defence autonomy.

The second part of the paper showed how similar dividing lines quickly resurfaced after the end of the Cold War, when the debate surrounding the European Security and Defence Identity alluded to renewed ambitions to develop a distinct European voice in security affairs. We have argued that European consent to considerable US involvement in defence affairs has hampered the development of such autonomy as much as intra-European divergences on this policy domain have. The EU–US relationship has undergone cyclical disruptions during, but more so after the end of the Cold War, yet the election of a new US president in 2016 has called its underpinning logic into question more forcefully than ever at a level of offi cial policy discourse.

As an external trigger factor, Donald Trump’s election and his scathing critique of NATO and Europe’s budgetary contributions to its defence expenditures has therefore elevated the EU’s CSDP ambitions to a new level. With a rather astonishing pace, strategy papers have been published, the Commission put forward the idea of a European Defence Fund (EDF) in June 2017, and “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO), a mechanism for closer defence cooperation already foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, was fi nally launched and activated in November 2017 (EU Council 2017) – even though the piecemeal streamlining of the operational, industrial, and political components of “strategic autonomy” leaves much to be desired.68

Finally, the state of CSDP and the public debate surrounding it needs to be put into a broader global context beyond transatlantic relations: The necessity for an overhaul of Europe’s global strategy was underlined against the background of the 2015 migration crisis, terrorist attacks in Europe and the inadequacy of European intelligence-sharing they exposed. A genuine strategic voice is not only needed in light of the often-discussed foreign policy re-orientations of actors like Russia and China, but also in light of the EU’s own passive response to crises in its own neighbourhood. It was this general state of alert that is refl ected in a German military study entitled “Strategic Perspective 2040”, which outlines different scenarios for the development of the international order. In the worst-case scenario, the study holds, “EU enlargement has been largely abandoned, other states have left the community, Europe has lost its global competitiveness”.69 The launch of PESCO in 2017 will not be the panacea for Europe’s search for a solution to the twin challenges of uncertainties in transatlantic relations and crises in the European neighbourhood and the Eurasian theatre, but can only be one element amongst many. ‘Strategic autonomy’ goes beyond CSDP. Yet, the brief historical overview of US-EU interaction on questions of institutional innovation presented in this paper has demonstrated that the transatlantic defence cooperation has been a crucial factor in enabling a margin of permissiveness for any European ‘strategic autonomy’ to develop.

#### Brexit and Trump thump – empirics prove that aff cards are written by unreliable Europe enthusiasts

Luis Simon 17, research Professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and Director of the Brussels office of the Royal Elcano Institute with a PhD in International Relations from the University of London (Royal Holloway College), “DON’T BELIEVE THE HYPE ABOUT EUROPEAN DEFENSE”, 06/27/2017, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-believe-the-hype-about-european-defense/

If you’re a Europe-based think tanker, policy wonk, or commentator, Donald Trump and Brexit are great for business. Just about every Brussels pundit is leading off his musings about Europe’s future with some sort of Trump or Brexit hook. If you haven’t heard by now that either Trump, Brexit, or — ideally — both offer historical windows of opportunity for European defense cooperation, you’re way outside of the Brussels bubble.

Those invested in the notion that the European Union can become strategically autonomous interpret pretty much whatever happens out there as a catalyst for greater European defense cooperation. Every time there is some sort of global crisis or “external shock,” catalyst-related narratives pop up — there are just too many politicians, officials, and pundits in Europe who lust after such narratives.

We have been here before. Many times. Think about the Balkan Wars triggering all that talk about the hour of Europe; of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 being widely viewed as wake up calls for Europe; or how Obama’s 2010 announcement of a pivot to Asia or reluctance to lead on Libya supposedly left Europeans no choice but to take security matters into their own hands. And let us not forget the 2003 Iraq War, when millions of Europeans took to the streets to protest against George W. Bush and Tony Blair’s mischiefs. That irresponsible, trigger-happy, and condescending American cowboy — not to speak of his British “poodle” — was supposed to be the mother of all catalysts for greater European defense cooperation.

And yet, no serious push for European strategic autonomy ever came about. E.U. defense die-hards have been left at the altar again and again. What they typically acknowledge, by way of consolation, is that these things take time and patience — Rome was not built in a day. They also argue important steps are being taken, and these things (i.e. the articulation of a serious E.U. defense policy) tend to move forward one step at a time. Yet, it is not easy to keep count on how many allegedly “important steps” have been taken along the long and winding road to European strategic autonomy. But perhaps the next catalyst will be the real thing that many seem to be waiting for. Enter Trump and Brexit.

Some say Trump is just too unstable and untrustworthy to look after European interests or be entrusted with the defense of the international liberal order. Others argue his emphasis on greater allied burden-sharing means Europeans need to step up their defense efforts. No matter which of these arguments you prefer, the conclusion is similar: Europeans have no option but to get their act together.

Yet, the notion that an irresponsible or disengaged America forces Europeans to take care of their own security could re-open old divisions on fundamental questions. One such question is nuclear deterrence. This is a question many could pretend to ignore during the two decades that followed the end of the Cold War, as the so-called peace dividend gave way to repeated European attempts to integrate Russia into the West. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea has put deterrence and defense back in Europe’s security agenda. And Moscow resorting to nuclear saber-rattling as a means of intimidation, and its ongoing efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal, underscore the renewed importance of nuclear weapons for European security. Any serious discussion on European strategic autonomy must square the nuclear circle.

This leads to a critical and highly uncomfortable question: Given widespread reluctance around the idea of a German nuclear deterrent, are Paris and Berlin ready to reach some sort of sharing agreement over the French nuclear deterrent? Most unlikely. The idea of national strategic autonomy is embedded in France’s political DNA, and an independent nuclear deterrent is the jewel of France’s autonomy crown. Germany, for its part, might have come to terms with its de facto strategic subordination to the United States through NATO. But it is unlikely to sign off on a serious European defense scheme if its role is to be relegated to playing second fiddle to France, let alone Britain. This red line was already set by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt during the Cold War. For Brandt, any European defense scheme independent from NATO would require a serious discussion about the modalities for including West Germany in the process of decision-making concerning the French nuclear deterrent: Germany’s role could not be “restricted to infantry tasks.” This continues to reflect German thinking.

As long as a shared nuclear deterrent is off limits, Berlin is unlikely to reject any sort of French (or British) nuclear umbrella, both for strategic and political reasons. Therefore, and for all the rhetoric about Trump having done more for European defense cooperation than anyone else, once the electoral fog clears in Germany, we should expect key European leaders to re-emphasize the centrality of the United States to Europe’s security and geopolitical architecture, and put their energies on co-opting the United States (mainly through NATO) and re-stating its commitment to European security.

Now let’s turn to Brexit and the myth that “British recalcitrance” has been responsible for the misfortunes of “European defense” over the last few decades. With the British out of the E.U. — or so the argument goes — the path is finally clear for European strategic autonomy. Never mind the sorry state of European military capabilities, or that Britain has actually been one of the leading advocates of greater military spending in Europe, and of investing in modern capabilities, having partnered with France to that effect. Never mind that, when it comes to defense, the French are just as likely to hold Germany’s hand and release Britain’s as Trump is to get a standing ovation in the European Parliament. And never mind the gulf between France and Germany, the supposed engine of an alleged European security enterprise.

France looks at military force not just through the lens of defense and deterrence, but also as a means of advancing its foreign policy and economic interests. And it makes a proactive use of it. Germany rejects that vision. It sees the military as a last resort defensive instrument. These are deeply ingrained differences of strategic culture. And any serious effort on the part of Germany to overcome its cautious and defensive attitude towards military power is likely to cause discomfort amongst some of its European partners, France included. In many ways, when it comes to defense spending and its attitude towards the use of force, Germany is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t.

At any rate, the differences in French and German attitudes toward military force are not just philosophical. They project into virtually any debate on European security cooperation, whether it relates to capability development, new institutional structures, or launching E.U. military missions.

The never-ending debate over the establishment of an operational headquarters for the planning and conduct of E.U. military operations give us an example that is both critical to any debate about European strategic autonomy and highly illustrative of the extent to which Franco-German differences can cripple the idea of a serious E.U. defense policy. The French have traditionally pushed for a fully staffed European Union military headquarters geared for planning and conducting expeditionary missions. The Germans have advocated for a more modest civilian-military planning facility focusing on low-intensity, peacekeeping, and stabilization missions. Despite numerous institutional reshuffles in the European Union’s planning and conduct structures, French and German red lines have barely moved since the CSDP was launched in 1999.

As a result, it has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly significant steps for the European Union to establish a “Military Planning and Conduct Capability” composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e. training and assistance) missions. By way of comparison, it took NATO barely a few years to set up a permanent, integrated military command structure with a strategic level command and several joint force and specific component commands capable of planning and conducting all types of operations.

All in all, ongoing differences amongst the European Union’s key member states suggest that neither Brexit nor Trump are likely to prove to be real game changers for E.U. defense cooperation, let alone lead to European strategic autonomy.

#### European defense spending and capabilities are insufficient to develop a posture independent of NATO’s assistance

Dr. Peter van Ham 2k, professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies at Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany, “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the U.S., and Russia”, April 2000, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-papers/europes-new-defense-ambitions-implications-nato-us-and-russia/europes-new-defense-ambitions-implications-nato-us#toc-finding-a-new-transatlantic-military-balance> /lg

Ever since NATO’s Brussels summit of 1994, the United States has, at least rhetorically, supported the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and expressed its readiness to make Alliance assets and capabilities available for WEU operations. Although American media were somewhat dumbfounded by what was generally seen as an overly ambitious European attempt to go it alone and establish a European military union (akin to the other EMU), U.S. officials have aired their agreement with Europe’s military push. At first, however, Washington was concerned with the message of the EU’s Cologne summit of June 1999, where the Europeans proposed to give the EU a defense character without committing themselves concretely to a commensurate increase in Europe’s military capabilities. In this respect, the subsequent Helsinki summit was reassuring to the United States, because it embedded the CESDP within the Atlantic security framework and followed through with concrete military headline goals.

In December 1999, following the Helsinki summit, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott argued that “[t]here should be no confusion about America’s position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period, end of debate.”7 But, of course, the transatlantic debate over the reorganization of European security and defense has just started in earnest, with many a serious quarrel and argument lying ahead. One of the main questions will be why, or perhaps even whether, the United States has given up its resistance to the organization of European defense within the EU. (Of course, answering this question depends to a large extent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections of November 2000. An Al Gore administration may be more supportive of Europe’s new defense ambitions than a George W. Bush administration.)

One classical American argument against an EU–based security system is that this would provide a backdoor security guarantee to EU members, both present and future, who are not covered by NATO’s Article 5. Because EU Member States like Finland and Austria, who are not members of NATO, will participate fully in the EU’s CESDP, they will indirectly affect the European input into NATO and may in crisis situations call upon the United States for military assistance. Other crucial questions remain outstanding: Are policy makers in Washington no longer concerned about the possible emergence of an “EU caucus” within NATO which may present the United States with inflexible European policy positions and faits accomplis? Is America now ready to give up its influence over European security and hand over its position of benign hegemonic leadership to the EU?

The Kosovo experience taught Europeans some embarrassing lessons and convinced many in the United States that crises in the EU's backyard should be solved by the Europeans themselves.

Clearly, the British change of heart on European defense urges the United States to rethink its attitude toward the EU’s budding defense ambitions. Now that Washington has “lost” its staunchest ally with an undiluted Atlanticist security orientation, the United States feels that the vitality of the Alliance may well be renewed by supporting the CESDP. What is more, the Kosovo experience not only offered Europeans some embarrassing lessons, but it convinced many in the United States that crises in the EU’s backyard should preferably be solved by the Europeans themselves. However, the timing and the vague modalities of Europe’s defense adolescence still trigger ample American Angst. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s famous “three D”s illustrate these concerns. Washington does not want: a decoupling of Europe’s security from that of America’s; a duplication of effort and capabilities; or discrimination against those allies outside the EU. Although Lord Robertson formulated a looser, and less negative, “three I”s (i.e., the indivisibility of the transatlantic link; the improvement of European capabilities; and the inclusiveness of all allies in Europe’s defense policy), working out the difficult practicalities of the CESDP is bound to become a source of strain in U.S - EU relations.

America’s Ambiguous Enthusiasm. Apart from good intentions on both sides of the Atlantic, little is clear in the emerging new balance of power between the EU and NATO and, hence, between “Europe” and the United States. Whereas WEU has always been an unequal partner of NATO in the defense field, the EU is bound to play a much more assertive and forceful role in shaping Europe’s institutional security landscape. Unlike NATO, the “New EU” will not only have a sturdy military capability at its disposal, but also a broad arsenal of economic, financial, and political instruments of statecraft. Given that most of Europe’s regional problems and conflicts may not be truly resolved by military means - at least not in the long run - the EU is bound to become the actor of choice to address European security challenges.

To all but a few Atlanticist purists, it is obvious that the strategic balance within NATO is in need of urgent change. Although the Kosovo experience has exposed this unhealthy imbalance within the Atlantic Alliance, the lack of frankness in the debate remains worrisome.8 Europeans and Americans alike know that NATO and the transatlantic relationship have to be recast and that this will be a painful and problematic exercise. It seems fair to say that if the EU is serious about its intent to establish a common European defense policy, the ultimate objective is to lessen Europe’s military dependency on America. Meanwhile, the EU now wants to have the possibility of fighting a Kosovo–like war without the consent and military support of the United States. This is, one would assume, nothing to be ashamed of and should be considered a normal ambition for an economic and political superpower-in-the-making like the EU. However, underneath the varnish of the Clinton administration’s cautious support lingers the concern that a more self-reliant Europe will undermine the old NATO tradition of U.S. hegemony and, therefore, risk a transatlantic decoupling. Both Europeans and Americans also fear that an increasingly isolationist and unilateralist U.S. Congress might react to a stronger European defense by arguing that it is now time to leave European security to the EU and bring home American troops.9 On the other hand, it is understood that the U.S. Congress may well be more likely to continue its support for NATO if the Europeans are serious defense partners. Based on the EU’s new defense moves, EU Member States have decided that the risk that a new European military force might undermine NATO is less significant than the threat posed by the status quo. Given these political imponderables, much attention is being paid to the managing and packaging of a rebalanced EU-U.S./NATO relationship.

There are three questions that remain unresolved that are bound to cause transatlantic problems over the next few years. The first is how closely should the EU’s CESDP duplicate NATO’s existing capabilities and institutional structures? The second concerns how to “sequence” the decision making processes in case of wars or crises and in the real military challenges the EU is likely to face in the decade ahead. The third involves the impact of the new strategic balance within the Alliance on Europe’s defense industrial base - and vice versa.

The Duplication Dilemma. French Defense Minister Alain Richard argued that “[w]hat fear of duplication really conceals is worry [in the United States] about the appearance of a new political partner, the European Union.”10 Although the Helsinki decisions look impressive on paper, it is clear that the EU’s military infrastructure will remain rather modest and nowhere near the size of the NATO military staff. A European military secretariat, reporting to Solana, will decide how many military planners the EU needs in its defense organization. The EU’s defense organization will, in any case, draw heavily on planning done in the EU’s Member States. The EU’s plans certainly do not involve, or imply, setting up standing European armed forces with a permanent multinational command, at least not for the near future. But, it will be difficult to foresee a serious CESDP that does not acquire better defense technology, better trained and deployable troops, as well as at least some parallel military structure.

NATO's European members had two million soldiers, yet had difficulty providing 40,000 troops for Kosovo.

It is on this point that Europe’s harsh political reality could start to overtake the strategy laid out at Helsinki, because it seems evident that EU Member States at present do not wish to allocate sufficient money to buy first-class, home-grown defense systems - ranging from intelligence gathering equipment, precision - guided weapons, and electronic warfare capabilities, to search and rescue forces. Although Europe spends 60 per cent of what the United States does on defense, the Kosovo war exposed Europe’s weaknesses. Despite having two million people in uniform, NATO’s European members were hardly able to place 40,000 troops in position in time to fight a regional war. Most European troops are still designed to repel a Soviet ground attack, rather than to rapidly deploy troops to nearby crisis situations. Because there is hardly any public support to increase defense spending, much is being made of trying to spend money more wisely and operating more efficiently by cooperating more closely on the European level. Lord Robertson argued perceptively that “[i]f you’ve got a budget that is 60 per cent of the American budget and is probably turning out 10 per cent of the capability then that is your first big problem . . . You can actually spend more money quite easily and get zero increase in capability.”11

But, is it really realistic to assume that Europe is spending enough on defense and all it needs to do is create more synergy and achieve more efficient defense cooperation? Money may be better spent to get “more bang for the Euro,” but, as John Chipman has argued: “Unless defense expenditure is allowed substantially to increase, the build-up of a serious [European] defense capacity will remain the stuff of communiqués.”12 According to NATO figures, the United States spends about 3.2 per cent of its GDP on defense (down from 6 per cent during the Cold War), with France and the United Kingdom spending 2.8 and 2.6 per cent, respectively; Germany (1.5) and Spain (1.4) find themselves at the low end of the spectrum. On average, defense spending by NATO’s European members has dropped by 22 per cent since 1992. It is of no surprise, therefore, that the United States is calling upon its European allies to take on a bigger share of the defense burden within NATO. In December 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen criticized Germany for spending too little on defense, arguing that this has a “profound and lasting impact on the capabilities, not only of [Germany], but of the alliance as a whole.”13

It is in this context that EU Member States may well decide to set spending targets for buying new satellite - based navigation and guidance systems, fighter airplanes and transport aircraft, and the other defense equipment needed to make European forces deployable within the 60-day target. In the run up to Helsinki, several proposals were aired, ranging from clear - cut defense convergence criteria (by François Heisbourg), which would include a 2 per cent minimum of GDP for defense and a 30-40 per cent minimum of the defense budget for procurement and R&D, to suggestions for a so-called European System of Force Elements (by Tim Garden and John Roper) for financing, military planning, and command arrangements.14 However, for those countries that still have to reach the Maastricht government debt criteria (which include Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain), it will be problematic to spend significantly more on defense without breaching EMU commitments. Politically, it will also be difficult to assure that no EU Member State drags its feet on defense spending in order to take a free ride on Europe’s CESDP. A Europe based on political solidarity cannot accept the silent NATO rule “who pays, plays.” However, even if the Europeans were willing to spend more on defense and set up defense benchmarks, the political momentum of the EU’s CESDP implies that they will “buy European.” This will receive a very cool reception in Washington and is likely to increase tensions within the Alliance.

### 2AC – No Solvency – Ukraine

#### EU can’t solve—Ukraine thumps

Judy Dempsey 2022, Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe, February 2022, “What Ukraine Reveals About NATO and the EU”, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86325> //skwon

They don’t like to admit it. But there is an unnecessary rivalry between NATO and the European Union. NATO is a military, defensive organization. The EU is an economic and political one with vast resources to make a difference to its own members and to its neighbors. Both organizations can complement each other, with NATO focusing on military operations and the EU on civilian missions. They don’t.

The crises in Europe’s eastern neighborhood, the latest being Russia’s military intimidation of Ukraine to the extent where Moscow is threatening its sovereignty and independence, are testing NATO and the EU. The outcome will affect Europe’s ability to act strategically and further integrate. The omens don’t look good for either.

NATO has had its fair share of differences among its European members. Recall how the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 almost destroyed NATO. Then, France and Germany lined up with Russia to oppose the attack. Moscow nearly succeeded in achieving its long-term goal of splitting the transatlantic alliance. NATO’s military intervention in Libya in 2011 and its recent withdrawal from Afghanistan left the alliance bruised and demoralized.

But since Russia began threatening to invade Ukraine again, NATO has shown some spunk. It is sending troops to the Baltic states and Romania. Even though Ukraine or Georgia are not going to join the alliance any day soon, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg refuses to cede to Russia’s demand to rule out accession.

NATO’s metal would be really tested if the alliance offered Ukraine the Membership Action Plan (MAP). That would set the country on a trajectory toward NATO but also lead to an unpredictable reaction by Russia. Remember how NATO opened the door to Montenegro that was nowhere near fit to join the alliance and was threatened by Russia if it did. Nothing happened.

That aside, on Ukraine NATO is holding the line. This is despite Germany’s attempts to stop some of its members from sending weapons to Kiev. More telling, and this is the big difference between NATO and the EU, most of the alliance’s Western and Eastern European members are now beginning to share a common threat perception.

That is not the case in the EU.

When it comes to Ukraine, apart from the near absence of any leadership from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, and the European Council, the bloc is rife with divisions.

It’s not only that the member states have struggled to agree on additional sanctions on Russia. The two most important countries, France and Germany, don’t seem to take the views of the Baltic states and the Central Europeans seriously, unlike NATO. It’s as if Central Europe and the Baltics have upset the comfort zone that characterized the EU before that big bang enlargement of 2004. The crisis in Ukraine has accentuated these differences.

The Central Europeans and the Baltic states can take some of the blame. Leaving aside the degradation of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary, the region’s influence inside the union would have benefited from forging alliances with the older member states.

Poland did that with Sweden when center-right party Civic Platform was in power in Warsaw in 2007–15. It led to the EU establishing a new policy for its Eastern neighborhood. Since 2015, when Law and Justice came to power, Poland hasn’t made full use of its size, geography, and history to shape an EU policy toward Ukraine and Russia.

This is the greatest weakness of the EU: its lack of any strategic policy toward its eastern neighbors on the one hand and toward Russia on the other. The crisis unfolding in Ukraine confirms these intellectual, political, and strategic deficits.

It would make a big difference if Germany took the lead in moving the EU out of this trough. That seems unlikely. The government in Berlin is divided over how to deal with Russia. A wing in Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic Party is wedded to an Ostpolitik. The supporters of this Cold War policy believe strengthening political, trade, and economic ties with Moscow would bring Russia closer to the West. Instead, it has made Germany’s political elites and economic lobbies more dependent on Russia.

This dependency, exemplified by the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has deepened the suspicions among the EU’s Nordic, Baltic, and Central Europeans about Germany’s ambivalence toward Russia and how its position toward Ukraine is seen through the prism of Russia. Indeed, because of these views, it’s hard to see the EU becoming more politically integrated. Distrust of Berlin runs deep.

France’s position too has rattled some EU governments. French President Emmanuel Macron’s calls for a Europe to build up its own strategic and defense capabilities are not about making the bloc independent of NATO or the United States. They are about preparing Europe to deal with the changing geopolitical landscape and power shifts, dominated by China and Russia. Their policies can undermine Western democracies and the stability of the EU if the Europeans do not recognize the nature of the threats posed by Beijing and Moscow. Ukraine should be forcing a major rethink in European capitals.

### 2AC – No Solvency

#### Independence from NATO decks case solvency – intra-European conflicts would prevent interoperability and joint capability development

Hugo Meijer & Stephen G. Brooks 21, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies & professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back”, Spring 2021, International Security 45(4), p. 7-43 /lg

An additional challenge is institutional. Europe’s strategic cacophony has prevented Europeans from developing an autonomous, military-planning, command and control (C2) structure.110 Indeed, a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service explains that one of the greatest challenges of European defense is “the lack of integration of the military structures of the Member States.”111 Although an effective and autonomous European defense would require the creation of a permanent planning and C2 infrastructure, the question of developing an autonomous Operational Headquarters (OHQ) has proven highly divisive.112 An OHQ was never established because of conºicting national interests and priorities among Europeans, in particular France, Germany and the UK. Whereas Paris has long supported the establishment of a military OHQ to bolster the EU’s strategic and operational planning structures and its contingency planning and C2 capacity, London has strongly resisted, seeing it as a duplication of NATO’s assets. Germany has stood somewhat in between, though closer to the UK, favoring a focus on civilian-military planning and C2, not least to avoid duplicating structures already existing at NATO.113 As a result, the EU remains entirely dependent on NATO or national assets for the planning and conduct of major executive operations, for which it has no autonomous military structures.114

If the United States were to pull back from Europe, it remains to be seen whether the Europeans could rely on a “Europeanized” NATO, in which the integrated structures would stay in place but without the United States.115 Military planning and C2 require a clear chain of command. When NATO was created, Europeans agreed to be under U.S. military command, rather than attempting the far more difªcult task of agreeing to be under the command of another European country or group of European states. More generally, as the hegemonic power in NATO, the United States has facilitated institutionalized cooperation among Europeans and helped partly contain Europe’s strategic cacophony.116 For decades, a U.S.-led NATO has been the overarching shaper of national defense policies and military transformation in Europe, helping overcome coordination and collective-action problems.117 In light of Europe’s deep-seated strategic divisions, a U.S. disengagement would amplify these coordination and collective action problems (assuming NATO survived) and would further hinder institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation at all levels: strategies and doctrines; training; operational learning; interoperability; and joint capability development. Likewise, without the United States, the persistent and profound divergence of threat perceptions and strategic priorities among Europeans is likely to impede their capacity to agree on shared C2 structures for conducting operations, except for the lowest end of the spectrum of conºict (e.g., peace support operations).118

As a result of strategic cacophony, the EU has, in fact, struggled mightily to create even the most minimal C2 structure. As Luis Simón underscores, “It has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly signiªcant steps for the European Union to establish a ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and assistance) missions,” with an advisory role only.119 Ultimately, given Europe’s deep-seated divergences, there is no basis for optimism that Europeans will be able to agree being under the permanent command of another European country for deterrence and defense or to consistently undertake effective institutionalized military cooperation without the enabling role played by the United States within NATO.

### **2AC – Squo Solves Autonomy**

#### Strategic autonomy is inevitable but would be blocked by a lack of financial resources absent NATO involvement – Brexit threw everyone for a loop

Hidayet Çilkoparan 18, Master of Science in the Department of International Relations at the Graduate School of Social Sciences of the Middle East Technical University, “EUROPE’S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS”, October 2018, Middle East Technical University, <https://open.metu.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11511/27654/index.pdf> /lg

Since the very beginning of the European integration process after WWII, integration in the field of security and defence has not always been high on the agenda. Similarly, the progress achieved in the new century has remained limited. Mainly due to the closer linkage of these areas to national security and sovereignty, and perhaps even more importantly because of NATO’s presence, considerable integration under the EU roof in these areas has not been considered possible or likely. Since the end of the Cold War, especially from the 2000s onward, however, the EU has been gradually deepening its integration in security and defence. Security challenges like conflicts in the Balkans and other countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, terrorism and irregular migration, as well as other new threats and challenges like cyber-security that have demonstrated that no country can counter and eliminate these threats alone have given momentum to the EU’s further integration in these areas. The rising strength of the RF in international politics, demonstrated by its aggressive interventions in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond under the leadership of President Putin has been another major factor. The recent rhetoric of the US leadership about disengagement from European security and NATO also appears to have encouraged the EU its efforts to quickly enhance its defence capabilities and accordingly new initiatives were undertaken.145

Academicians, thinkers, analysts, observers, politicians, so on, who have been observing the development of EU security and defence policy and trying to understand why Europe felt the need to develop its own defence capabilities, while a robust collective security organization like NATO existed. Some explained this need through the IR theory of structural realism. They argued that “instead of balance of power, balance of threat” need to be focussed on. Even though the EU did not perceive an immediate threat from the USA, its decades-long hegemony in Europe, sustained through NATO, has started becoming disturbing and Europeans decided to take steps to balance the US, so that they could enjoy a balanced partnership in transatlantic relations and affect US decisions on actions it may take with regard to international security and stability.146

In this respect, the concepts of “balancing” and “bandwagoning” have also been referred to in explaining European instincts as to when to side with or counterbalance the USA. When there was a most serious threat to all like the Soviet Union and expansion of communism, Europeans clustered around the USA (bandwagoning) and felt safer. Once the major threat disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the European states began moving in a different direction to balance the USA, so that they can maintain a healthier and balanced relationship with this global hegemon.147

In fact, the USA’s attitude regarding the ESDP (CSDP) has remained unclear, because US decision-makers have been hesitant about how far the ESDP / CSDP should be developed and what level of duplication with NATO capabilities would not be considered “unnecessary duplication.” Indeed, the USA has been facing a dilemma since the end of the 1940s: it has been pushing European countries/the EU to become a stronger partner by enhancing their military capabilities, while it has been concerned about the possibility that a well-developed CSDP could duplicate NATO and weaken transatlantic ties. Issuance of the Saint Malo Declaration by France and the UK in December 1998 has only deepened the US concerns. Although the EU, at its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, reassured the USA by confirming that it would act and undertake operations only if and when "NATO as a whole is not engaged", even this confirmation could not fully eliminate US worries about potential rivalry of the EU to the NATO over time. The debate held among France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg on setting up “a separate EU operational planning headquarters in Tervuren/Belgium” provoked further concern in Washington. This initiative has been blocked by the UK and a potential source of further disagreement in transatlantic ties has been eliminated, at least until Brexit. Whether the separation of the UK from the EU may lead EU members to revisit this idea remains to be seen. On the other hand, as noted also under previous Chapter, acquisition of more reliable European defence capabilities by the EU enjoys strong support among the European public and governments. The EU’s efforts are likely going to be watched closely by not only the USA, but also other NATO allies that are not EU members, like Turkey and Norway. As the EU continues to develop its military and autonomous planning capabilities, it will be inevitable to have closer co-ordination between the EU, the USA and non-NATO European allies (and Canada), as three major components of the European security architecture. Within this framework, NATO would seem to be a potential forum for co-ordinating the interests and initiatives of these actors.148

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and the Libya crisis in 2011, which once again exposed the EU’s inefficiency as an institution in the face of such a major crisis, the EU, on the one hand, has been trying to streamline its internal decision-making processes regarding security and defence and come up with a common vision of strategic interests, as prescribed in the 2016 EUGS. Even in the existence of improved procedures and conceptual framework, it remains unclear whether the EU and its major powers will be able to act decisively and effectively in the face of a new crisis. After the international intervention in Libya, the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria have also shown that the EU is slow and relatively inefficient if the USA does not contribute and even lead. The US announcement of a foreign policy adjustment shifting its focus to East/South Asia has to some extent worried the EU and encouraged it to take some new steps, but it appears that it will take many years for the EU to become a major power, which would be taken seriously by the RF in terms of military strength. Especially, if and when the RF is involved in a major crisis, the EU immediately turns to the USA for its involvement and leadership. In this regard, the development of the CSDP and strategic autonomy may not affect the nature of transatlantic relations, as far as major conflicts involving the RF are concerned.149

Brexit has the potential to expose the EU’s military weaknesses and inability to act to respond to major crises in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Its ambition to achieve strategic autonomy is going to be undermined as well. At minimum, it will take time, increased efforts and more funds to achieve it, because Brexit is going to take away up to a quarter of the EU’s defence capabilities. France may assume an increased role in this regard, however, it does not have the necessary financial resources and looks to Germany to provide much-needed funds to foster EU integration in the field of defence. Germany prefers to carry out projects aiming to enhance defence capabilities under the EU structural framework.150

Accordingly, the implementation of the CSDP, after Brexit, would be a lesser concern to the USA, as it will take time for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy and develop a balanced interaction as an equal partner in transatlantic relations. Given President Trump’s strong emphasis on the military might of the USA, the EU faces difficult times and stands at a crossroads whether to take tough decisions on whether to follow US political leadership as their strategic interests and approaches in international relations continue to gradually diverge. In this regard, if the CSDP turns out to be a success story by implementing its various projects and initiatives, the EU has the potential to become an increasingly disobedient ally of the USA pursuing its own interests. In fact, it is already possible to observe such differentiation in the approaches of the USA and the EU, by looking at their policies towards North Korea and Iran.151

At this point, in addition to what has already been considered above, it may be useful to take a closer look into the possible impact of Brexit on transatlantic relations.

5.4. Brexit’s Potential Impact on Transatlantic Defence Co-operation

Under the previous chapter and section, I examined the possible impacts of Brexit on the security and defence projects and co-operation carried out under the EU’s CSDP. In this section, applying a strategic approach, I will try to analyse Brexit’s possible implications on transatlantic defence co-operation, including relations between the EU and NATO.

The current major challenges to security in Europe underline the fact that geographical neighbours are interdependent on each other for ensuring their security from all kinds of threats and challenges. Even though the UK is leaving the EU, it is not going to move away from the EU. European security analysts find it important that the two sides are conscious of this reality and carry out Brexit negotiations accordingly, so that they do not weaken European and Euro-Atlantic defence arrangements.152

Security analysts consider the implications of Brexit on European security very important. It is mainly because, for the EU, the Brexit will result in the loss of one of its two major military powers.153 On the other hand, there is NATO to cushion the likely impacts of Brexit on European security.

In fact, thanks to its advanced military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, the UK has been a major contributor to European security and defence, which has increased the EU’s weight and credibility in world politics. Some predict that that as a result of Brexit, the EU’s power will be reduced by up to 25 percent. In any rate, it is a significant loss. Therefore, in case Brexit negotiations are not conducted in a spirit of mutual compromise and in a tidy manner, it may reflect negatively on the strength and security of both sides. The EU can be expected to move ahead with its old plan to set up a European operational headquarters, which has thus far been obstructed by the UK, which has viewed NATO as the primary military security organization in Europe.154

Furthermore, the UK, thanks to its special relations with the USA, has been a leading voice within the EU for the interests of Eastern European countries, so called New Europe. These countries have been looking to the UK for guidance on many issues. In the absence of the UK, the EU will be a significantly different environment for them. The UK has also functioned within the EU as a counterweight to Germany and France, which traditionally favour closer and deeper integration in all possible areas, and its departure therefore worries some Eastern European countries, as they won their independence not long ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One can argue that in the post-Brexit period, the UK may still be able to intervene in EU defence projects and initiatives through these countries.155

With the UK’s departure from the EU, even though it will remain a NATO member and thereby committed to European security, France will be the only nuclear and significant conventional military power in the EU. In this regard, France has already started asking Germany to increase its financial contributions to the enhancement of Europe’s defence capabilities. New EU initiatives like EDF and PESCO got underway, however, it is not year clear how the USA will react to these new steps. In case Germany provides additional financial contributions to European projects but refrains from making a noticeable contribution within the NATO framework, it is possible that it could elicit further reaction from the USA. As long as the USA remains as a member, the issue of avoiding duplication, on which the USA is sensitive, has the potential to cause further EU-USA frictions, as the latter expects EU members to purchase major defence products from US companies.156

Under the current European security architecture, NATO and the EU, even though they co-ordinate to some extent, undertake their own planning in the areas of defence, capability enhancement and operations. The separation of a major player like the UK from the EU may bear consequences on the modalities of cooperation between these two organizations. It might strengthen the relative position of NATO within those modalities. On the other hand, as discussed extensively above, it might also permit deeper integration among remaining EU member states that could in turn allow the EU to become a more credible interlocutor in the NATO-EU relationship. Therefore, as a final point under this section, it appears important to note the fact that the Brexit will further expand the “power asymmetry” between NATO and the EU. A most feasible solution for the EU may be to keep pursuing “strategic autonomy” from NATO, by including the UK to the extent possible, through creative arrangements under EUGS / CSDP.157

### 2AC – Nuclear Deterrence

#### EU is strengthening its deterrence capacity now

Agnes Szucs 2022, She is an EU reporter at Anadolu Agency, and previously worked as a Media and Communication Manager at the European Parliament, January 2022, “EU must develop deterrence capacity: Bloc's foreign policy chief”, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-must-develop-deterrence-capacity-blocs-foreign-policy-chief/2519897> //skwon

The EU must expand “a lot” its deterrence capacity as it was not able to prevent the war, the EU foreign policy chief said on Tuesday, referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. “Our deterrence has not been strong enough to stop (Russian President Vladimir) Putin’s aggression,” Josep Borrell told EU lawmakers at the European Parliament’s plenary session dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian war. He stressed that the EU must strengthen its “deterrence capacity a lot” to be able to prevent wars. He argued that the Russia-Ukraine war shed a light on the fact that the common EU defense is “no longer a luxury, it is a necessity,” stressing that the bloc needs “instruments for coercion, retaliation, and counter-attacks.” This will be “the birth certificate of a geopolitical Europe,” Borrell stressed, referring to the bloc’s new defense strategy, the so-called Strategic Compass that will be adopted next week. At the same time, he asserted that the EU has already demonstrated its ability to act as a “hard power” by imposing strong sanctions on Russia. Borrell’s Strategic Compass sets concrete proposals and timelines for strengthening the EU defense, such as setting up a swiftly deployable EU force of 5,000 troops, investing in industrial capabilities, and securing the bloc against cyberattacks. The plan would strengthen the bloc’s defense in a complementary way to NATO requirements. EU lawmakers will vote later on Tuesday for a resolution condemning Russia's war on Ukraine.

Latest developments Since Russia's war on Ukraine began last Thursday, it has been met by outrage from the international community, with the EU, UK, and US implementing a range of economic sanctions on Russia. The EU adopted last week three sanctions packages against Russia, targeting among others, President Putin, top diplomat Sergey Lavrov, the Russian banking sector, and key state-owned companies. On Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially signed his country's request to join the EU. In an open letter, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania expressed support for Ukraine's swift candidacy. So far, at least 136 civilians, including 13 children, have been killed and 400 others, including 26 children, injured in Ukraine, according to UN figures. Around 660,000 people have fled Ukraine to neighboring countries, the UN refugee agency said on Tuesday.

#### NOTE: Do not read this specific card against EU-NATO CP

#### The EU can’t solve nuclear deterrence – even France’s nuclear sharing won’t work

Nagashima ’21 [Jun; 05/18/21; Master’s in European Security from the Tsukuba University, Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy, Lieutenant General (Retired); "European Strategic Autonomy and Nuclear Deterrence- Progress of EU-NATO Cooperation and Impact on the Indo-Pacific Region –," International Information Network Analysis | SPF, <https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/nagashima_06.html> //smarx, AZG]

Most recently, in February 2020, President Macron proposed to deepen Europe's Joint Strategic Culture through the sharing of French nuclear weapons, based on the idea of increasing opportunities for other EU member states to access the French nuclear strategy through participation in nuclear-operation-related exercises and other activities, thereby creating an overall picture of Europe's nuclear deterrence[19]. However, within the EU, the legal decision to maintain the current NPT regime and the historically deep-rooted anti-nuclear public opinion became entangled in a complex manner, and the EU handled the issue cautiously, assuming that discussions on nuclear forces could undermine political unity.

In view of the circumstances surrounding the EU, the best solution for responding to the nuclear threat that Europe faces is not to use the European nuclear deterrence approach proposed by France, but to develop a cooperative nuclear posture through loosely-based cooperation, within a scope that does not violate the sovereignty of the nuclear countries(U.S., U.K. and France), as a part of the strengthening of the current EU-NATO relationship. This means a political process in which the items related to nuclear deterrence will be added to EU-NATO cooperation, and consultations and coordination on specific nuclear cooperation are started at a working-level. Albeit in the form of NATO's provision of extended nuclear deterrence to the EU, this is a realistic response that the EU, with its complicated nuclear issues, can tolerate in terms of strategic autonomy.

In other words, it is difficult for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy in the core part of its nuclear deterrence strategy, and the solution is cooperation with NATO. Needless to say, NATO is an alliance centered on the United States, which contradicts the direction of Europe's strategic autonomy. However, I think that realistic decisions made by the EU, without being swept away by ideals, should be appreciated from a broader perspective.

#### Despite growing insecurity, the EU won’t embrace nuclear deterrence – there’s scattered views

Rapnouil ’18 [Manuel Lafont; 12/19/18; Senior policy fellow and former head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, headed the Political Affairs Division of the Department for UN affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development; and Tara Varma, senior policy fellow and head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations; and Nick Witney, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, first chief executive of the European Defence Agency in Brussels; "Eyes tight shut: European attitudes towards nuclear deterrence," ECFR, <https://ecfr.eu/special/eyes_tight_shut_european_attitudes_towards_nuclear_deterrence/> smarx, AZG]

The 29 July edition of Germany’s Welt am Sonntag hit newsstands like a bombshell. The weapon in question was painted in German national colours, and illustrated the front-page headline “Do we need the bomb?” Inside, the writer argued that: “For the first time since 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany is no longer under the US nuclear umbrella.”[1]

It is extraordinary that this question should arise so prominently in peace-loving, anti-nuclear Germany. But it is not before time. This year, the European Council on Foreign Relations conducted a comprehensive survey of attitudes towards nuclear issues across the member states of the European Union. Two overarching themes emerged. Firstly, despite the growing insecurity all around them, Europeans remain unwilling to face up to the renewed relevance that nuclear deterrence ought to have in their strategic thinking. Secondly, and as a consequence, national attitudes remain much where they were when the subject dropped off the agenda at the end of the cold war – which is to say, scattered across the entire spectrum from those who continue to see nuclear deterrence as an essential underpinning of European security to enduring advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

This is hardly the only important challenge on which Europeans’ views are all over the place, and about which they would prefer to remain in denial. As one official told the authors, “Europe has not only outsourced its security, but also its security thinking”. But when set against the dramatic changes occurring in the international security environment, the results of this research demonstrate that there is now an urgent need for Europeans to think about, and debate, nuclear deterrence anew. A ‘German bomb’ is unlikely to prove attractive – not least to Germans themselves. Europeans must instead give serious consideration to whether a Franco-British ‘nuclear umbrella’ would be a possible and desirable complement to, or substitute for, the current US nuclear guarantee to Europe. This paper concludes that this issue is significant but belongs to a range of nuclear weapons-related topics with which Europeans need to re-engage.

Regardless of whether it proves viable to agree to a “nuclear Saint-Malo”, to borrow a phrase coined by a member of ECFR’s pan-European research team, one thing is clear: the situation is such that Europeans can no longer pretend that their declared ambition of “strategic autonomy” is more than an empty phrase unless they engage seriously on the nuclear dimension. The absence of a European deterrent may be a fatal flaw for such an ambition. Besides nuclear capabilities, there are many ways in which Europe can move towards its stated bid for strategic autonomy. But, without this, many Europeans will continue to believe that Russia will always hold the whip hand in any military confrontation with a Europe not backed by a credible US nuclear guarantee. And yet most Europeans’ approach to the nuclear dimension of a rapidly shifting strategic environment is to keep their eyes tight shut.

#### The EU will never go nuclear – each country wants to reduce nuclear weapons and it won’t fly with the public

Rapnouil ’18 [Manuel Lafont; 12/19/18; Senior policy fellow and former head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, headed the Political Affairs Division of the Department for UN affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development; and Tara Varma, senior policy fellow and head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations; and Nick Witney, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, first chief executive of the European Defence Agency in Brussels; "Eyes tight shut: European attitudes towards nuclear deterrence," ECFR, <https://ecfr.eu/special/eyes_tight_shut_european_attitudes_towards_nuclear_deterrence/> smarx, AZG]

European attitudes are a patchwork of opinions: the United Kingdom and France are nuclear powers in their own right, with public opinion more or less solidly behind this status. The historical experience of Poland and the Czech Republic leads these states to be more confidently supportive of nuclear deterrence. Countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany have seen civil society clash with their governments’ decisions around hosting nuclear weapons. Ireland and Austria are active campaigners for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Despite all this, most EU member states have two things in common in this matter. First, nearly all of them share an official, if ostensible, commitment to reducing nuclear weapons: research for this paper revealed that only three member states harbour reservations about the goal of nuclear disarmament. This is all while many of these countries remain within NATO, which is of course underpinned by the potential of nuclear-backed intervention via Article 5. The potential tension between this pro-disarmament stance and the enjoyment of the US nuclear umbrella is something yet to fully play out.

Second, nuclear weapons have little salience in the public imagination. On the occasions in the late cold war period when European governments were obliged to make difficult decisions about nuclear weapons, these became fraught and contested in the country at large as well as in parliament. But with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Western governments and populations became less obliged to think, and argue, about nuclear weapons with the degree of heat and rigour that they had had to prior to 1989. In Europe, most were more than content to enjoy the happier and more hopeful international environment, and to simply dismiss nuclear worries from their minds. Rather than peace underpinned by nuclear weapons, as many cold war leaders characterised it, Europeans began to enjoy peace with nuclear weapons still around. Nuclear weapons disappeared from the public debate. The end of the cold war led to an effort to reduce the total number of nuclear warheads in the world, with Russia and the US doing substantially more heavy lifting in this regard even if they still possess considerably more weaponsthan France and the UK, which have both moved significantly towards minimal deterrence.

If anything, the public today is rather inclined towards disarmament – which may partly explain its relative lack of concern as the total number of weapons in the world fell, although it is hard to say that Russia and the US won many plaudits for their efforts either. If a shift in public attitudes does now come about, this may emanate from high-level activism. In the context of the TPNW, the decision to award the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons hints at a new wave of abolitionism. This also finds stronger expression in national politics: last year’s German federal election saw the Social Democrat challenger for chancellor promise the removal of US nuclear weapons from the country. And, in the UK, a unilateralist disarmer is now leader of the Labour Party and Scotland’s ruling Scottish National Party is firmly opposed to nuclear weapons.